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Socio-technical	disagreements	as	ethical	fora.	Parabon	NanoLab’s	forensic	DNA	SnapshotTM	service	
at	the	intersection	of	discourses	around	robust	science,	technology	validation,	and	commerce.	
	
Matthias	Wienroth,	PEALS	Research	Centre,	Newcastle	University,	UK	
	
Abstract	
DNA	profiling	and	databasing	technologies	have	become	integral	to	criminal	justice	practices	in	many	
countries,	 and	 their	 reliability	 is	 now	 rarely	 challenged.	 However,	 a	 new	 set	 of	 forensic	 genetics	
technologies	 has	 emerged,	 one	 of	 which	 is	 Forensic	 DNA	 Phenotyping	 (FDP).	 FDP	 aims	 to	 infer	 a	
person's	 visible	 traits	 from	 DNA,	 and	 to	 predict	 biogeographical	 ancestry,	 in	 order	 to	 provide	
intelligence	for	difficult	investigations.	Debates	around	FDP	have	been	largely	academic	and	legal,	but	
in	some	countries	they	have	become	of	public	interest.	Here,	many	scientists	and	practitioners	tend	
to	avoid	publically	articulating	disagreement	about	the	 limitations	of	such	technologies.	This	paper	
attends	to	a	rare	public	disagreement	about	technoscientific	practices	in	the	wider	forensic	genetics	
community	about	a	commercial	forensic	service	called	SnapshotTM	which	utilises	FDP.	Its	analysis	of	
scientists'	ethical	reasoning	about	the	development	and	use	of	this	set	of	technologies	contributes	to	
understanding	 the	 political	 economy	 of	 forensic	 genetics,	 at	 the	 intersection	 of	 scientific	 ethics,	
forensic	practice,	and	commercial	resources	that	make	visible	and	enable	further	scientific	research	
in	the	field.	More	widely,	 this	paper	proposes	that	attending	to	public	ethical	debates	such	as	this	
offers	 much-needed	 insight	 into	 the	 various	 intersecting	 stakes	 that	 co-constitute	 emerging	
technologies.		
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Introduction	
In	 January	 2017,	 the	 Virginia-based	 research-company	 and	 commercial	 provider	 of	 DNA	 analyses	
Parabon	NanoLabs	announced	that,	using	an	emerging	DNA	analysis	method,	 it	had	contributed	to	
the	successful	detection	of	a	double	homicide	in	Rockingham	County,	North	Carolina	(Gannon,	2017;	
Parabon	NanoLabs,	2017;	PR	Newswire,	2017).	Two	years	earlier,	the	company	had	been	approached	
by	the	Sheriff's	Office	in	order	to	provide	intelligence	in	the	ongoing	French	Homicides	investigation	
which	had	remained	unsolved	since	2012.	While	blood	drops	had	been	found	at	the	crime	scene,	their	
DNA	profile	could	not	be	attributed	via	comparison	with	police	DNA	database	entries,	and	the	DNA	
profiles	of	more	than	50	people	with	access	to	the	house	of	the	murder	victims.	The	company	was	
asked	to	conduct	DNA	phenotyping	 instead,	 in	order	to	develop	an	approximation	of	the	potential	
perpetrator’s	 appearance.	 The	 analysis	 (Figure	 1)	 encouraged	 investigators	 to	 renew	 their	 efforts	
using	standard	DNA	profiling	in	the	husband’s	family	of	the	murder	victims’	daughter.	Eventually,	a	
match	 between	 the	 blood	 in	 the	 house	 and	 the	 brother-in-law	 of	 the	 victims’	 daughter	 was	
established.	
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Figure	1	Snapshot	Prediction	Results	in	French	Homicides	(Source:	Parabon	NanoLabs	2017)	
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In	this,	and	an	astounding	number	of	other	USA-based	cases,	this	emerging	technology—the	inference	
of	a	person’s	visible	 traits	 from	DNA—has	been	portrayed	as	a	 fully	operational	application	 in	 the	
public	domain,	delivering	public	goods.	Parabon	NanoLabs	(from	here:	Parabon)	was	approached	to	
provide	 support	 in	 the	 French	 Homicides	 investigation	 shortly	 after	 announcing	 its	 forensic	 DNA	
phenotyping	SnapshotTM	service	to	much	media	attention	in	January	2015,	suggesting	then	that	it	can	
be	 usefully	 applied	 in	 law	 enforcement.	 The	 company	 had	 previously	 described	 its	 research	 thus:	
“Using	 data	 mining	 and	 modeling,	 we	 can	 look	 at	 a	 genotype	 alongside	 single	 nucleotide	
polymorphisms	(SNPs),	which	are	highly	correlated	with	our	physical	characteristics,	and	do	things	like	
compose	virtual	mug	shots.	 It	has	a	 lot	of	potential	 forensics	applications”	 (Duke	University	News,	
2013).	 Parabon	 suggested	 that	 its	 novel	 technique	 combines	 existing	 arrays	 of	 DNA	 markers,	
developed	by	some	of	the	 leading	European	and	USA-based	forensic	genetic	phenotyping	research	
teams,	 with	 a	 proprietary	 data-mining	 analysis	 software	 to	 offer	 law	 enforcement	 agencies	 an	
appealing	product.	Its	main	features	are	a	predictive	facial	composite	image	and	a	short	list	of	traits,	
including	skin,	eye	and	hair	colour,	freckle	frequency,	and	so-called	‘biogeographical	ancestry’,	on	a	
sliding	scale	presenting	the	most	likely	and	least	likely	inferences.	These	interpretations	are	presented	
together	with	a	world	map	indicating	possible	geographic	regions	of	the	donor’s	genetic	ancestry	(see	
Figure	1;	however,	it	is	not	possible	to	infer	hairstyle	from	DNA).		
Parabon’s	 SnapshotTM	 service	 presents	 forensic	 DNA	 phenotyping	 (from	 here:	 FDP)	 as	 a	 tool	 for	
establishing	social	order	by	predicting	from	DNA	the	appearance	of	a	person,	including	facial	features	
and	morphology.	By	drawing	on	genetic	and	 forensic	 imaginaries	 that	comprise	notions	of	genetic	
essentialism	and	exceptionalism	(Williams,	2010),	the	company’s	service	 invokes	the	association	of	
left-behind	 traces	 with	 criminal	 activity	 and	 the	 identifiability	 of	 suspects	 using	 DNA.	 When	 the	
availability	 of	 this	 commercial	 forensic	 service	was	 announced	 publicly,	 SnapshotTM	was	met	with	
considerable	 response	by	 criminal	 justice	 stakeholders	 and	 scientific	 practitioners	 researching	 and	
working	in	the	field	of	FDP,	in	particular	in	reference	to	the	use	of	prediction	composite	profiles	of	
unknown	persons	based	on	DNA	trace	analysis.	This	paper	explores	scientists’	responses	as	an	‘ethical	
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moment’	(Heeney,	2017),	contextualising	this	instance	within	a	discourse	of	contrasting	technology	
identities	 of	 FDP.	 The	 analysis	 of	 ethical	 considerations	 made	 by	 stakeholders	 opens	 up	
understandings	 of	 an	 emerging	 technology	 to	 wider	 engagement	 about	 its	 potential	 societal	
articulation.	Therefore,	above	and	beyond	the	formalised	processes	scientific	practitioners	tend	to	be	
enlisted	 in	 to	 engage	 with	 ethics	 (Smith-Doerr	 and	 Vardi,	 2015),	 this	 paper	 aims	 to	 reclaim	
disagreement	 between	 scientific	 practitioners	 about	 scientific	 basis	 and	 societal	 application	 of	
emerging	 biotechnology	 as	 constructive	 for	 considering	 what	 may	 constitute	 ethical	 technology	
governance	 practices.	 The	 analysis	 focuses	 primarily	 on	 scientific	 ethics,	 but	 its	 embedding	 in	 the	
societal	 application	of	 technology	marks	 it	 as	a	debate	around	 socio-technical	 ethics.	As	 such,	 the	
paper	proposes	that	attending	to	public	ethical	debates	offers	much-needed	insight	into	the	various	
intersecting	stakes	that	co-constitute	emerging	technologies.	
	
The	story	unfolds	
When	Parabon	took	SnapshotTM	to	the	US	market	in	January	2015,	they	did	so	to	considerable	interest	
from	 law	 enforcement	 and	 from	 the	media.	While	 the	 company	 probably	 expected	 to	 hear	 some	
sceptical	voices,	and	see	critics	 raise	civil	 liberties	and	human	rights	concerns,	 they	clearly	did	not	
prepare	for	the	significant	critique	they	were	to	face	from	the	scientific	community.		
Press	responses	were	primarily	intrigued	by	Parabon’s	new	forensic	service,	and	featured	an	element	
of	scepticism	as	to	how	advanced	the	underlying	technology	really	is	and	whether	its	contribution	can	
considerably	and	reliably	improve	the	way	that	unknown	suspects	are	identified	(e.g.	Cookson,	2015;	
Diep,	2015;	Pollack,	2015).	The	New	York	Times	conducted	what	they	described	as	“an	informal	test”	
of	the	technology	(Murphy,	2015),	asking	Mark	Shriver	to	use	the	predictive	software	tool	that	was	
developed	by	him,	 Peter	 Claes	 and	 their	 team	 (cf.	 Claes	et	 al,	 2014;	 Claes,	Hill	 and	 Shriver	 2014).	
Advised	by	Shriver	himself,	the	test	was	based	on	peer	recognition	in	the	editorial	office	and	turned	
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out	to	be	fairly	unsuccessful	in	facilitating	facial	reconstruction	and	recognition	in	peers,	partially,	as	
reported,	due	to	the	lack	of	analysing	contextual	factors	of	age	and	body	morphology,	such	as	weight.	
This	 failed	 experiment	was	 contextualised	 by	 Parabon	 reporting	 that	 it	 had	 already	 been	working	
together	with	USA	law	enforcement	in	providing	so-called	‘Snapshot	prediction	composite	profiles’	of	
unknown	suspects	based	on	DNA	trace	analysis	in	several	investigations,	including	in	the	cases	of	the	
‘Serial	 Creeper’	 in	 Florida	 (Rosen,	 2015)	 and	 a	 24-year	 old	murder	 investigation	 in	Massachusetts	
(Masters,	2016).	Parabon	is	not	the	only	commercial	actor	who	has	started	to	stake	their	claim	in	the	
field	of	forensic	DNA	phenotyping	and	facial	reconstruction	from	DNA.	The	forensic	service	provider	
Identitas	has	been	working	with	Toronto	police	on	solving	cold	cases	by	providing	FDP	services	using	
their	 Forensic	 Chip	 since	2014	 (Stroud,	 2014),	 and	 the	 forensic	 science	 company	 Illumina	 recently	
released	a	next	generation	sequencing	platform	which	combines	standard	short	tandem	repeat	(STR)	
markers	 with	 SNP	 and	 other	 alternative	 markers	 that	 can	 deliver	 novel	 analyses,	 including	 FDP,	
alongside	established	DNA	profiling	(cf.	Børsting	and	Morling,	2015).	Other	firms	such	as	ThermoFisher	
are	also	working	on	platforms	that	include	an	array	of	phenotyping	and	ancestry	markers.	However,	
so	far	Parabon	seems	to	be	the	only	one	of	these	to	integrate	facial	reconstruction	in	their	prediction	
composite	profiles.		
The	response	to	SnapshotTM	by	scientists	was	critical,	featuring	concern	about	the	confident	portrayal	
of	the	technology	as	being	able	to	reconstruct	faces	from	DNA	(e.g.	Pollack,	2015),	and	discomfort	
about	 the	 lack	 of	 information	 on	 how	 Parabon’s	 analysis	 software	 works	 (author’s	 personal	
communication	 with	 forensic	 biostatisticians	 and	 software	 developers).	 Only	 some	 welcomed	
Parabon’s	 initiative	 (cf.	 Parabon	 Nanolabs,	 2015).	 There	 is	 tangible	 concern	 among	 parts	 of	 the	
scientific	community	that	commercial	forensic	service	providers	may	make	overly	optimistic	promises	
about	 the	 capacities	 of	 their	 services	 on	 which	 they	 cannot	 deliver,	 or	 that	 the	 way	 they	 use	
technologies	may	even	cause	adverse	impacts	on	public	perception	of	the	use	of	such	technologies.	
Leading	FDP	developer	Manfred	Kayser,	for	example,	 is	quoted	as	saying	that	trait	expressions	can	
change	 over	 time,	 or	 can	 be	masked	 (Cookson,	 2015),	 relativizing	 the	 contribution	 of	 FDP	 to	 the	
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persuasively	 looking	 reporting	of	 the	Snapshot™	profile.	 Some	 in	 the	 forensic	 genetics	 community	
have	expressed	concern	about	the	forensic	service’s	potential	 impact	on	the	scientific	credibility	of	
FDP	and	the	research	community	overall.	When	the	 lack	of	peer-reviewed	papers	on	the	scientific	
basis	 of	 the	 service	 was	 addressed,	 Parabon	 seemingly	 reluctantly	 responded	 that	 Snapshot™	
composite	 faces	 are	 generated	 using	 technology	 that	 is	 based	 on	 the	 peer-reviewed	 research	
conducted	by	 leading	 scientists	 such	as	Mark	Shriver	and	Peter	Claes.	This	 reluctance	 to	mark	 the	
contribution	of	scientists	in	the	community	to	the	underlying	science	in	the	forensic	services	may	have	
been	 caused	 by	 concerns	 around	 impacts	 on	 intellectual	 property	 rights	 through	 Parabon’s	
exploitation	of	scientific	knowledge.	Another	way	of	understanding	this	reluctance	may	be	the	lack	of	
extensive	 knowledge	 or	 data	 about	 relevant	 genotype-phenotype	 relationships	 in	 the	 variation	 of	
faces	(e.g.	Claes,	Hill	and	Shriver,	2014;	Hallgrimsson	et	al,	2014).	Shriver	and	others	have	challenged	
the	notion	that	the	number	of	currently	established	genetic	markers	would	be	sufficient	to	reliably	
reconstruct	a	facial	image	from	DNA	for	investigative	purposes.	Interestingly,	the	company	seems	to	
hold	 the	 role	 of	 ‘leader	 in	 DNA	 phenotyping’	 (Augenstein,	 2016)	 in	 the	 imaginary	 of	 key	 security	
agencies	such	as	the	USA	Department	of	Defense.	
One	 likely	 reason	 for	 this	primarily	critical	 response	 from	 leading	FDP	scientists	 is	 that	SnapshotTM	
entered	into	a	rich	and	ongoing,	and	in	parts	public	debate	around	the	ethics	of	using	advanced	DNA	
analyses	for	security	purposes,	suggesting	that	scientists	are	aware	that	scientific	engagement	with	
technology	has	an	integral	societal	dimension.	
	
Contextualising	SnapshotTM	
Policy	makers,	law	enforcement	agencies,	and	forensic	practitioners	have	shown	considerable	interest	
in	regulating	for	the	introduction	of	forensic	genetic	developments	such	as	FDP	and	SnapshotTM	into	
criminal	justice	practice.	Its	scientific	champions	have	argued	that	technologies	and	practices	currently	
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in	routine	use	by	law	enforcement	and	security	agencies	may	be	insufficient	to	deliver	security	and	
justice	 objectives	 under	 certain	 circumstances,	 such	 as	 when	 none,	 very	 limited,	 or	 no	 reliable	
information	about	a	potential	suspect	is	available.	They	argue	that	emerging	technologies,	and	related	
innovations	 in	practice,	may	provide	 the	 tools	 to	do	so:	By	 introducing	new	ways	of	using	existing	
technology—e.g.	 using	profiles	 from	DNA	databases	or	dragnets	 to	 conduct	 familial	 searching—or	
new	technologies	such	as	FDP,	both	of	which	have	been	subject	to	legal	and	ethical	deliberations	in	
many	jurisdictions	–	e.g.	Germany,	France,	the	USA	–	for	some	time.	And	yet,	ethical	disagreements	
and	uncertainty	about	the	application	of	new	forensic	genetics	technologies	continue,	and	specialised	
legal	frameworks	are	not	yet	in	place	in	most	jurisdictions,	with	the	exception	of	the	Netherlands,	and	
a	 very	 permissive,	 validation-based	 system	 in	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 and	 many	 states	 in	 the	 USA.	
However,	 this	paper	 takes	up	the	call	 that	 further	deliberations	about	 these	technologies,	and	the	
changes	in	practice	they	may	necessitate	or	facilitate,	are	indispensable.	Simultaneously,	FDP	emerges	
as	part	of	a	field	of	practice	that	has	considerable	standing	with	its	criminal	justice	users,	and	in	which	
science	 practitioners	 aim	 to	 balance	 the	 need	 to	 uphold	 the	 ‘gold	 standard’	 of	 DNA	 profiling	 and	
databasing	with	 the	 drive	 for	 support	 for	 novel	 technologies.	When	 a	 new	 technology	 enters	 the	
criminal	 justice	 system,	 questions	 around	 its	 usefulness,	 value	 and	 proportionality	 in	 addressing	
security	and	justice	priorities	are	raised	(cf.	Williams	and	Wienroth,	2017).	FDP	with	its	ambition	to	
ascribe	appearance	and	ancestry	to	an	unknown	person—as	such	 its	(re-)production	of	the	human	
body	and	its	cultural	position	in	society	via	genetic	reference	data	of	wider	population	groups—marks	
the	significance	of	exploring	these	aspects	which	are	central	to	negotiating	technology	application	in	
social	contexts.	For	the	criminal	justice	system,	the	technology	signals	a	shift	in	the	way	that	genetic	
data	 are	 used:	 from	 evidence	 to	 intelligence,	 and	 from	 individuation	 to	 attribution,	 that	 is	 from	
comparing	markers	for	establishing	whether	a	trace	may	have	originated	from	a	specific	person,	to	
ascribing	certain	attributes	that	are	shared	by	groups	of	people	to	an	unknown	person.	
The	co-emergence	of	biotechnologies,	legal	frameworks,	and	social	order	is	based,	in	part,	on	the	ways	
in	which	legal	institutions	and	frameworks	anticipate	and	engage	with	new	forms	of	surveillance	based	
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on	biotechnology	and	bioinformation,	and	how	‘this	ongoing	process	redefines	the	rights	and	status	
of	 the	 suspect	 body	 and	 the	 credibility	 of	 criminal	 evidence’	 (Lynch	 and	McNally,	 2009,	 p.	 284).	
Following	 Timmermans	 and	 Berg’s	 argument	 that	 any	 technology	 being	 developed	 in	 research	 is	
always	 technology-in-practice	 (2003),	 ethical	 deliberation	about	 the	 introduction	and	use	of	novel	
technologies	needs	to	be	inclusive	of	the	intentions	of	technology	developers	and	users	(Toom	et	al,	
2016).	Catherine	Heeney’s	idiom	of	the	“ethical	moment”	(2017)	frames	such	an	empirically	informed	
approach	 to	 contextualising	 and	 analysing	 snapshots	 of	 ethical	 disagreements,	 attending	 to	
disagreements	about	what	is	ethical	conduct	in	technology	research	and	use.	The	basis	for	such	an	
approach	is	the	understanding	of	science	as	the	product	of	negotiation,	an	outcome	of	the	settling	of	
controversies	(Latour,	1987).	Heeney	suggests	that	the	“ethical	moment”	is	a	deliberative	opportunity	
for	scientists	to	explore	scientific	and	socio-technical	conduct,	informed	but	not	delineated	by	existing	
practices	 and	 normative	 guidelines.	 Here,	 understandings	 about	 the	 social	 place	 of	 a	 specific	
technology	can	be	produced	and	tested,	e.g.	by	discussing	the	credibility	of	a	specific	technological	
claim,	 and	 claims	 regarding	 the	 utility	 of	 a	 specific	 technology.	 Practically,	 this	 suggests	 value	 for	
governance	efforts	arising	from	disagreements	by	considering	a	technology’s	potential	ways	of	‘being’	
in	society.	
Scientists’	 disagreements	 with	 SnapshotTM	 are	 articulated	 against	 the	 backdrop	 of	 global	 societal	
debates	 around	 expanding	 forensic	 genetics	 technologies	 in	 criminal	 justice	 systems,	 in	 which	
scientific	 practitioners	 and	 scientists	 seek	 to	 retain	 control	 over	 the	 debate	 about	 scientific	
disagreements,	and	self-regulatory	measures	take	on	a	significant	role	within	the	forensic	genetics	
community	(cf.	Wienroth,	2018).	
	
Forensic	DNA	phenotyping	
At	the	heart	of	SnapshotTM	lies	the	set	of	technologies	called	forensic	DNA	phenotyping,	from	which	
arise	the	claims	made	by	the	company	to	be	able	to	provide	comprehensive	 information	about	an	
Author:	Matthias	Wienroth	(PEALS,	Newcastle	University)	
10	
	
unknown	 person,	 even	 facial	 reconstruction.	 In	 the	 late	 1990s,	 the	 now	 defunct	 United	 Kingdom	
Forensic	Science	Service	tested	phenotypical	markers	for	pigmentation,	and	commissioned	research	
into	the	genetic	association	of	facial	features	(Motluk,	1998),	in	part	encouraged	by	insights	into	the	
genetic	basis	for	red	hair	colour	(Valverde	et	al,	1995).	Since	then,	considerable	knowledge	about	the	
genetics	of	trait	expression	for	criminal	justice	applications	has	been	generated	(cf.	Chaitanya	et	al,	
2018).	 Social	 science	 scholars	 Koops	 and	 Schellekens	 (2008),	 Sankar	 (2012)	 and	 Murphy	 (2013)	
approach	forensic	DNA	phenotyping	as	a	set	of	 two	technologies	that	use	SNP	biomarkers	to	 infer	
visible	traits	and—together	with	a	range	of	other	markers—aim	to	predict	biogeographical	ancestry.	
While	 SNPs	 code,	 or	 contribute	 to	 coding	 for	 certain	 characteristics,	 biogeographical	 ancestry	 is	
predicted	based	on,	both,	the	frequencies	of	biomarkers	that	are	associated	with	certain	geographic	
population	groups,	and	some	specific	 coding	genes,	e.g.	 for	 skin	pigmentation	 (Halder	et	al,	2008;	
Phillips	et	al,	2007;	Phillips,	2015).	Scientists	have	been	combining	both	analyses	in	their	work	(e.g.	
Freire-Aradas	et	al,	2014;	Walsh	et	al,	2011;	Yun	et	al,	2014),	suggesting	that	a	distinction	between	
the	two	technologies	will	not	necessarily	be	made	in	investigative	practice,	rather	they	will	be	used	in	
tandem	(M’charek	et	al,	2012),	especially	as	new	high-throughput	sequencing	technology	that	can	
analyse	diverse	markers	 in	parallel	becomes	available	 (cf.	Børsting	and	Morling,	2015).	SnapshotTM	
uses	both	technologies	simultaneously.		
Disagreement	about	how	 these	 technologies	work	on	a	 scientific	basis	and	how	 they	are	used	 for	
investigative	purposes	provides	 fertile	ground	for	comprehensive	discussion	of	ethical	governance,	
which	in	part	commenced	in	a	brief	exchange	between	geneticists	Kayser	and	Schneider	(2009;	2012)	
and	social	analysts	M’charek,	Toom	and	Prainsack	(2012).	This	exchange,	which	took	place	in	a	leading	
forensic	 genetics	 journal,	 is	 in	 essence	 a	 conversation	 about	 two	 different	 perspectives	 on	 FDP	
which—on	 that	 platform—did	 not	mesh	 into	 a	 comprehensive	 ethical	 conversation.	 Since	 then,	 a	
number	of	attempts	have	been	made	for	the	two	communities	to	engage	in	a	similar	format,	leading	
to	 mixed	 results	 (e.g.	 Buchanan	 et	 al,	 2018,	 and	 Caliebe	 et	 al,	 2018;	 Lipphardt	 et	 al,	 2017,	 and	
Schneider,	2017;	Staubach	et	al,	2018;	Toom	et	al,	2016).		
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In	these	and	other	discussions,	different	‘technology	identities’	(cf.	Ulucanlar	et	al,	2013)	have	been	
produced,	giving	emphasis	to	different	matters	of	concern.	One	describes	FDP	as	a	value-adding	tool	
delivering	scientific	objectivity	 in	an	 investigation	that	requires	hard-to	acquire	 intelligence,	and	as	
such	contributes	to	delivering	public	goods	 including	security	and	 justice.	The	other	frames	FDP	as	
culturally	sensitive	technology	that	can	only	be	considered	in	the	context	of	social	practices,	values	
and	norms	(e.g.	Toom	et	al,	2016)	in	order	to	avoid	social	conflicts	that	may	arise	from	a	failure	to	
acknowledge	and	reflect	on	the	role	of	social	assumptions	in	genetic	knowledge	and	technology.	There	
are	some	high	profile	cases	in	which	FDP	information	has	added	to	investigations	(cf.	M’charek,	2008;	
Phillips	et	al,	2009;	Sankar,	2010),	and	some	in	which	it	has	been	misapplied	(Phillips,	2015;	Travis,	
2009;	Tutton	et	al,	2014)	or	misinterpreted	(cf.	Hansard	Col	168W	2005;	McCartney,	2006),	providing	
practice	context	to	both	technology	identities.	
	
FDP	as	enhancing	
Phenotyping	draws	from	many	population-wide	sequencing	and	genome	association	projects,	aiming	
to	identify	commonalities	across	individuals	in	population	groups.	Visible	traits	of	a	person	are	posited	
by	researchers	to	add	value	to	criminal	investigations	in	cases	where	current	routinely	employed	DNA	
profiling	 and	 databasing	 technologies	 cannot	 provide	 sufficient	 information	 to	 enable	 the	
identification	of	an	unknown	suspect	(e.g.	Kayser	and	Schneider,	2009;	Ruiz	et	al,	2012;	Spichenok	et	
al,	2011;	Walsh	et	al,	2011).	The	proposed	link	between	genotype	and	phenotype,	which	forms	the	
basis	 of	 the	 negotiated	 utility	 of	 FDP	 in	 criminal	 investigations,	 at	 the	 same	 time	 raises	 new	data	
security	 and	privacy	 concern	 (cf.	Guillen	et	 al,	 2000)	 as	well	 as	 legal	 challenges.	 In	 2013,	 the	USA	
Supreme	Court	in	the	case	Maryland	vs.	King	ruled	in	favour	of	compulsory	collection	of	DNA	from	
arrestees,	but	based	on	the	understanding	that	non-coding	regions	of	the	genome	are	used	(Murphy,	
2013).	 Addressing	 some	 of	 these	 legal	 and	 ethical	 considerations,	 proponents	 argue	 that	 FDP	
facilitates	an	improvement	on	less	reliable	but	nonetheless	applied	investigatory	technologies	such	as	
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eye-witnessing,	 and	 they	 contest	 privacy	 concerns	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 visible	 traits	 are	 non-private	
information	(e.g.	Kayser	and	de	Knijff,	2011,	p.	183;	Koops	and	Schellekens,	2008,	p.	186).	For	the	case	
of	biogeographical	 ancestry	 it	has	been	 suggested	 that	 its	prediction	will	 enhance	 the	accuracy	of	
records	held	by	law	enforcement	(Phillips,	2015).	Another	element	of	this	technology	identity	 is	 its	
expected	use	in	very	serious	cases	in	which	criminal	justice	objectives	would	trump	privacy	concerns	
(e.g.	Kayser,	2015),	however	some	potential	users	have	already	started	viewing	FDP	as	a	routine	tool.	
Both	 views	 share	 the	 expectation	 that	 FDP	 can—proportionally	 and	 usefully—contribute	 to	 re-
establishing	 social	 order	 through	 the	 delivery	 of	 otherwise	 perhaps	 unreliable	 or	 unobtainable	
intelligence	in	order	to	reduce	the	suspect	pool	in	an	investigation.	
	
FDP	as	culturally	sensitive	
A	very	different	technology	identity	for	FDP	focuses	on	its	cultural	context,	articulating	concern	about	
the	capacity	of	genetic	technologies,	which	are	based	on	typing	populations,	to	disrupt	or	aggravate	
existing	issues	of	social	order.	Duster	(2003)	and	Skinner	(2013)	have	warned	of	the	‘scientification’	of	
‘eugenics’	 in	 policing,	 and	 of	 the	 ‘racialisation’	 of	 forensic	 genetics.	 These	 processes	 describe	 the	
production	 of	 genetic	 ‘facts’	 in	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system	 that,	 while	 their	 analytical	 basis	 is	
scientifically	informed,	are	translated	into	investigative	practice	through	the	lens	of	cultural	values	by	
law	enforcement	and	justice	stakeholders.	They,	and	others,	suggest	that	an	association	of	‘ethnicity’	
and	 ‘race’	with	biological	aspects	may	 lead	to	 forensic	genetics	becoming	the	harbinger	of	genetic	
truths	that	are	translated	 into	social	 identities	 (topically,	see	also	the	debate	around	David	Reich’s	
new	book:	Kahn	et	al,	2018;	Reich	2018a;	2018b).	The	potential	problems	that	these	commentators	
describe	are	based	on	analyses	of	institutional	practices	and	cultural	prejudices	in	law	enforcement	
which	present,	for	 instance,	as	disproportionate	focus	on	specific	minority	groups	who	would	then	
become	 part	 of	 an	 investigative	 line	 of	 enquiry	 due	 to	 culturally	 informed	 biological	 associations	
(Chow-White	and	Duster,	2011;	Duster,	2014;	Genewatch	UK,	2005;	M’charek	et	al,	2014;	Ossorio	and	
Duster,	2005).	This	association	 is	 seen	as	of	particular	 concern	 in	 linking	 the	utility	of	FDP	 to	 such	
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groups	that	are	in	appearance	most	easily	distinguishable	from	majority	populations	(M’charek,	2000;	
2008).	Along	this	line	of	argument,	the	utility	of	using	genetic	ancestry	prediction	in	law	enforcement	
is	seen	as	contestable	on	the	basis	that	communities	tend	not	to	define	themselves	in	genetic	terms,	
and	 that	 social	 identity	 plays	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 any	 self-declared	 ancestry	 (cf.	 Chow-White	 and	
Duster,	2011;	Skinner,	2013).	Operationally,	the	argument	here	is	that	DNA	intelligence	and	evidence	
always	need	to	be	considered	in	context	of	other	information	(Wienroth	et	al,	2014).	
	
Intersecting	tropes:	validation,	transparency,	‘robust’	science,	and	commerce	
Building	on	the	context	above,	this	section	attends	to	four	related	framings	in	which	scientists’	critique	
of	 Parabon	 and	 its	 forensic	 genetics	 service	 can	 be	 understood.	 It	 shows	 how	 tropes	 central	 to	
scientific	concerns	can	conflict	with	commercial	considerations,	but	suggests	that	simultaneously	the	
commercial	dimension	to	forensic	technologies	and	services	is	vital	for	providing	resources	for	forensic	
genetics	research,	providing	insight	into	the	conundrum	of	the	political	economy	of	forensic	genetics	
between	scientific	ethics,	forensic	practice,	and	resources	to	continue	research.	
	
Validation	
Scientific	 validity	 of	 the	 SnapshotTM	 service	 lies,	 perhaps	 unsurprisingly,	 at	 the	 very	 heart	 of	 the	
debate.	 It	 is	 closely	 linked	 to	 scientific	 robustness,	 and	 adds	 a	 formal	 level	 that	 can	 generate	
confidence	in	the	science	used	in	the	criminal	justice	system.	The	source	of	information—here	specific	
markers—play	a	central	role	as	scientific	practitioners	challenge	the	claim	that	existing	technologies	
can	deliver	sufficient	information	required	to	predict	facial	morphology	from	DNA.	The	utility	of	these	
sketches	is	contested	based	on	current	scientific	research.	An	academic	forensic	geneticist	who	has	
contributed	 to	 investigations	 using	 FDP	 technologies	 has	 argued	 that	 “even	 if	we	 find	 a	 face	 that	
resembles	what	we	are	looking	for,	we	don’t	know	if	it	is	the	face	connected	to	the	DNA”	(personal	
Author:	Matthias	Wienroth	(PEALS,	Newcastle	University)	
14	
	
communication	with	author)	because	of	a	lack	of	understanding	about	the	underlying	genetic	links.	
Criticism	 implies	 that	 the	markers	used	by	Parabon	 to	 reconstruct	 facial	 images	are	either	not	yet	
sufficiently	 matured	 to	 provide	 information	 relevant	 to	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system	 (e.g.	 forensic	
geneticist	Lutz	Roewer	cited	in	Kastelan,	2017),	or	that	they	can	only	provide	very	limited	information	
from	which	the	company,	perhaps	too	freely,	extrapolates	how	a	face	may	be	reconstructed.	Manfred	
Kayser	 asserts	 that	 the	 biomarkers	 Parabon	 claims	 to	 use	 for	 SnapshotTM	 are	 primarily	 linked	 to	
biogeographic	ancestry	and	sex,	information	from	which	“at	best	one	can	infer	the	average	face	of	a	
female	or	male	European	or	African”	(Weigmann,	2015,	quote	translated	by	the	author)	rather	than	a	
precise	facial	shape	of	the	person	whose	DNA	trace	is	analysed.	This	chimes	with	the	asserted	lack	of	
sufficient	data	about	 relevant	genotype-phenotype	 relationships	 in	 the	variation	of	 faces	by	other	
scientists:	Mark	Shriver	and	others	have	previously	challenged	the	notion	that	the	number	of	currently	
established	genetic	markers	would	be	sufficient	to	reliably	reconstruct	a	facial	 image	from	DNA	for	
investigative	purposes	(e.g.	Claes	et	al,	2014;	Hallgrimsson	et	al,	2014)	which	has	been	reasserted	by	
forensic	scientists	more	recently	(e.g.	Sense	about	Science	and	EUROFORGEN,	2017,	pp.	30-35).	Even	
for	relatively	well	developed	prediction	models	for	externally	visible	traits	there	is	acknowledgement	
that	findings	remain	incomplete	(Caliebe	et	al,	2018).		
Furthermore,	practitioners	have	implied	that	the	service	may	offer	too	large	an	interpretative	element	
in	 the	 visual	 representation	 of	 the	 analysis	 report—an	 aspect	 of	 work	 that	 some	 scientists	 argue	
should	be	left	to	the	criminal	 justice	users	of	technology	(presumably	to	preserve	the	imaginary	of	
scientific	objectivity	of	forensic	genetic	technologies).	The	underlying	assumption	here	seems	to	be	
that	while	the	investigative	interpretation	may	err,	the	scientific	analysis—if	done	correctly—remains	
neutral	to	the	effects	of	the	interpretation,	which	is	an	argument	of	ethical	conduct	in	science	that	
affects	both	reliability	and	legitimacy	of	science.		
	
Epistemic	transparency	
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The	 novelty	 of	 SnapshotTM	 is	 the	 proposition	 of	 facial	 reconstruction	 using	 DNA-based	 composite	
predictions.	Parabon	has	argued	that	this	reconstruction	is	informed	by	data	mining,	presumably	of	
repositories	that	contain	research	data	on	the	genetics	of	facial	morphology.	Worryingly	for	scientists,	
the	black-boxing	of	scientific	practices	in	a	package	service	does	not	permit	users—such	as	laboratory	
scientists—to	understand	the	mechanisms	through	which	the	analysis	takes	place.	This	means,	that	
information	which	would	be	used	as	basis	for	investigative	interpretation	and	decision-making	would	
have	to	be	taken	at	face	value.	It	also	means	that	peer-reviewed	validation	of	the	mechanisms	of	this	
specific	service	might	not	be	feasible.	Drawing	from	scientists’	contentions	about	SnapshotTM,	there	
seems	very	little	understanding	about	the	‘data	mining’	technique	that	seems	so	central	to	Parabon’s	
argument	about	the	value	of	their	service	to	law	enforcement:	Which	data	sources	are	mined,	how	
reliable	 are	 these	 sources,	 and	 how	 does	 the	 choice	 of	 algorithms	 employed	 in	 this	 data	mining	
process	impact	on	the	validity,	reliability,	and	objectivity	of	the	data?	Many	members	of	the	academic	
forensic	 community	 feel	 strongly	 about	 making	 analysis	 software	 openly	 available	 to	 the	 wider	
forensic	 community,	 and	 as	 such	 indicate	 concerns	 about	 the	 proprietary	 nature	 of	 Parabon	 and	
others’	 black-boxed	 data	 mining	 and	 analysis	 methods.	 Previously,	 many	 have	 suggested	 that	
analytical	tools	that	inhabit	a	crucial	space	in	making	investigative	decisions	should	be	Open	Source,	
to	enable	users	to	understand	how	analysis	results	are	produced	and	the	community	to	continually	
improve	methodology,	 reflecting	 support	 for	 wider	 (peer)	 scrutiny	 of	 software	 (cf.	 Balding,	 2013;	
Haned,	2011;	Hansson	et	al,	2014).	It	requires	forensic	practitioners	with	the	appropriate	training	to	
utilise	analysis	software,	and	it	requires	good	communication	training	to	enable	users	to	interpret	the	
data	and	translate	it	into	investigative	practice.	The	discussion	around	Open	Source	reflects	some	of	
the	ethical	choices	made	by	parts	of	the	community	around	reproducibility	and	transparency	in	both	
the	 laboratory	 and	 the	 investigative	 context.	 Arguably,	 law	 enforcement	 agencies	 may	 be	 more	
interested	in	the	confidence	and	clarity	with	which	results	are	presented	rather	than	in	tracing	the	
analytical	 pathway	 along	which	 these	 results	 have	 been	 arrived	 at—presumably	 as	 long	 as	 this	 is	
limited	 to	 intelligence,	 and	 can	 lead	 to	 using	 DNA	 profiling	 technologies	 on	 suspects	 to	 produce	
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profiles	of	evidentiary	quality.	However,	for	scientific,	practitioner	and	policy-making	stakeholders	the	
considerations	 of	 scientific	 robustness,	 translating	 into	 legitimacy	 for	 the	 technology	 as	 well	 as	
forensic	genetics	overall,	may	be	crucial	to	managing	the	risk	of	using	emerging	and	novel	technologies	
in	the	criminal	justice	system,	and	the	related	aspects	of	confidence	and	trust.	
	
‘Robust’	science	as	legitimacy	
In	a	wider	societal	setting,	social,	legal,	and	moral	proportionality	and	justification	present	the	basis	
for	negotiating	legitimacy.	At	the	same	time,	the	concept	can	also	be	applied	to	the	scientific	discourse	
in	terms	of	proportionality	and	justification	around	what	constitutes	good	practice,	the	credibility	of	
science,	 and	 responsibility	 towards	 potential	 technology	 users	 or	 those	 affected	 by	 their	 use.	
Considerations	 of	 scientific	 legitimacy	 bring	 together	 validation	 and	 epistemic	 transparency	 with	
scientific	 responsibility,	 and	 is	 reflected	 in	 the	 forensic	 genetics	 community’s	 concern	 about	
SnapshotTM’s	potential	impact	on	the	scientific	credibility	of	FDP,	forensic	genetics	as	a	whole,	and	the	
community	 itself.	 This	 is	 primarily	 evidenced	 in	 the	 link	 made	 by	 Parabon	 between	 FDP,	 facial	
modelling	software,	and	the	facial	reconstruction	expressed	in	the	“mug	shot”	(Duke	University	News,	
2013)	of	an	unknown	person:		
“In	fact,	there	is	a	commercial	provider	in	the	USA	who	asserts	that	they	can	already	generate	
virtual	 facial	 reconstructions	 from	 DNA.	 Those	 are,	 however,	 ethnic	 stereotypes,	 not	
individualised	 faces.	 From	my	 perspective,	 such	 claims	 are	 a	 disgrace	 for	 robust	 science.”	
(Peter	Schneider	in	an	interview	on	radio	WDR	5,	translated	from	German	by	the	author)	
This	 assertion	 associates	 SnapshotTM	 with	 cultural	 rather	 than	 scientific	 tropes,	 the	 reference	 to	
‘ethnic	 stereotypes’	 suggesting	 a	 denial	 of	 scientific	 legitimacy.	 This	 critique	 may	 also	 aim	 to	
distinguish	racialized	debates	from	current	scientific	work	in	forensic	genetics,	thereby	addressing	not	
just	Parabon	but	also	those	critical	voices	that	are	concerned	about	the	use	of	genetic	material	for	the	
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purpose	of	categorising	and	identifying	unknown	persons	according	to	population	categories	such	as	
skin	pigmentation	or	biogeographical	ancestry.	As	such,	SnapshotTM	is	also	used	to	articulate	social	
responsibility	of	 forensic	geneticists	working	 in	 the	 field.	A	 second	example	of	 this	moment	 in	 the	
debate	is	an	excerpt	from	NBC	News,	citing	USA-based	forensic	geneticist	Susan	Walsh	on	Parabon:	
“You	can’t	just	say	that	you	can	do	something	and	ask	people	to	trust	you,”	Walsh	says,	adding	
that	 the	research	 just	 isn’t	 there	yet	 to	make	a	 lifelike	picture	of	a	person’s	 face.	“They’re	
promising	something	they	can’t	give.”	(Gannon,	2017)	
This	promissory	element	of	SnapshotTM,	while	integral	to	science	articulations	generally,	is	criticised	
by	this	scientific	commentator	on	the	basis	of	a	lack	of	scientific	reliability	for	the	analytical	power	of	
the	service.	By	linking	reliability	to	the	trust	of	“crime	fighters”	(ibid.),	the	critique	here	renders	it	a	
concern	about	credibility	for	the	technology,	its	application,	as	well	as	its	provider,	Parabon.	
Further	supporting	scientists’	argument	about	lack	of	scientific	credibility	of	SnapshotTM	and	Parabon,	
other	scientific	practitioners	have	shown	concern	about	 the	 legitimacy	of	commercial	providers	 to	
apply	technology	without	the	involvement,	and	crediting,	of	the	scientific	work	that	has	gone	into	the	
development	of	commercial	services.	When	the	lack	of	peer-reviewed	papers	on	the	scientific	basis	
of	the	service	was	addressed,	Parabon	seemingly	reluctantly	responded	that	SnapshotTM	composite	
faces	are	generated	using	technology	that	is	based	on	the	peer-reviewed	research	conducted	by	Mark	
Shriver	and	Peter	Claes.	This	reluctance	to	mark	the	contribution	of	scientists	in	the	community	to	the	
underlying	science	in	the	forensic	services	stands	in	contrast	to	good	academic	practice	and	may	be	
caused	by	concerns	around	impacts	on	intellectual	property	rights	through	Parabon’s	exploitation	of	
scientific	 knowledge,	 and	 by	 scientific	 limitations	 to	 the	 analytical	 power	 of	 Parabon’s	 combined	
approach	of	DNA	analysis,	data	mining,	and	computational	facial	reconstruction.	
The	 case	 has	 been	 deployed	 by	 parts	 of	 the	 academic	 scientific	 forensic	 community	 to	 articulate	
boundaries	 between	 legitimate	 phenotyping	 and	 scientifically	 unsound	 applications,	 or	 those	
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considered	to	be	of	a	social	nature	and	as	such	not	at	the	heart	of	a	scientific	ethic.	The	commercial	
provider	 of	 SnapshotTM	 emphasises	 the	 service’s	 appeal	 to	 criminal	 justice	 agents,	 whereas	 the	
articulation	of	concerns	by	the	academic	forensic	community	can	be	seen	as	efforts	to	draw	together	
rules	 and	 norms	 about	 scientific	 conduct,	 the	 validity	 of	 the	 underlying	 science,	 and	 the	 value	 of	
robust,	that	is	peer-reviewed	and	published	science.	This	narrative	crystallises	around	re-anchoring	
the	inference	of	visible	traits	and	prediction	of	biogeographical	ancestry	in	the	scientific	domain,	and	
linking	scientific	robustness	to	FDP’s	role	as	a	valuable	tool	for	societal	use—but	by	re-asserting	the	
scientific	primacy	over	societal	and/or	commercial	interpretations	of	the	underlying	science,	an	issue	
that,	in	practice,	tends	to	locate	interpretive	primacy	(the	right	to	define	what	is	legitimate	and	what	
is	not)	of	forensic	evidence	with	the	legal	side	in	the	court	room.	However,	FDP	and	the	SnapshotTM	
service	can	produce	intelligence,	information	that	is	unlikely	to	make	it	into	any	juridical	discussion	in	
the	court	room,	and	as	such	offers	the	opportunity	for	scientists	to	re-assert	scientific	primacy	over	
forensic	 information	 in	 the	 investigative	 part	 of	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system.	 The	 audience	 that	
scientific	stakeholders	primarily	aim	their	arguments	at	are	criminal	justice	agents	as	those	who	would	
utilise	 the	 forensic	 services,	 who	make	 decisions	 about	 forensic	 service	 procurement,	 and	whose	
experience	with	the	technology	would	impact	on	future	demand	for	such	services.	
	
Commercial	value	and	the	forensic	science	community	
While	on	the	surface	the	emphasis	 in	the	debate	around	SnapshotTM	focuses	primarily	on	scientific	
ethics,	 the	 aspect	 of	 the	 forensic	 market	 and	 commercial	 service	 provision	 provides	 a	 significant	
context	 and	 reference	 point.	 Numerous	 specialised	 companies	 develop	 forensic	 equipment	 and	
technologies,	often	in	these	endeavours	working	very	closely	with	scientists	and	forensic	practitioners	
who	 are	 both	 producers	 and	 users	 of	 such	 marketable	 goods.	 In	 this	 commercial	 landscape,	 the	
European	forensic	genetics	community	is	closely	engaged	with	developers	of	technologies,	but	very	
much	 less	so	with	providers	of	 forensic	services—since	they	are	competitors	 for	access	to	criminal	
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case	 work,	 which	 generates	 both	 scarce	 financial	 resources	 as	 well	 as	 data	 for	 further	 research.	
Parabon	 operates	 primarily	 as	 a	 service	 provider	 with	 SnapshotTM,	 despite	 its	 claim	 of	 having	
developed	its	own	service.	The	company	appears	to	only	recently	have	entered	into	a	collaborative	
relationship	with	an	academic	forensic	geneticist	(Bruce	Budowle,	a	former	FBI	forensic	practitioner),	
and	then	only	under	pressure	to	deliver	evidence	of	the	viability	of	SnapshotTM	via	scientific	validation	
in	 a	 peer-reviewed	 paper.	 To	 understand	 scientists’	 articulations	 of	 reliability	 in	 response	 to	
SnapshotTM,	we	need	to	take	into	account	that	accounts	of	legitimacy	are	also	informed	by	scientific	
practitioners’	 preoccupation	with	 their	 scientific	 livelihood.	 This	 is	 connected	 to	 concerns	 around	
ensuring	scientific	legitimacy	of	emerging	research	by	ensuring	the	reliability	of	scientific	findings	and	
technological	developments,	but	also	to	building	and	retaining	the	capacity	to	continue	conducting	
research.	Many	of	the	key	researchers	in	the	field	deliver	forensic	services	to	criminal	justice	systems	
themselves,	and	in	part	fund	their	research	from	such	service	provision,	in	fact	may	source	samples	
and	data	from	such	work	(regulation	in	Germany	and	the	Netherlands,	e.g.,	includes	the	option	to	use	
criminal	justice	data	for	research	purposes).		
	
The	SnapshotTM	debate	helps	trace	concerns	by	science	practitioners	that	their	efforts	to	make	the	
case	 for	 FDP—for	 further	 research	 as	well	 as	 for	 confidence	 of	 users	 in	 an	 informed	 and	 reliable	
forensic	analysis—may	be	undermined	by	misunderstandings.	Such	misunderstandings	are	articulated	
by	scientists	as	unscientific	and	as	leading	to	misapplications	of	a	technology	they	have	considerable	
academic	investment	in.	SnapshotTM	emerges	as	a	placeholder	for	the	negotiation	of	FDP	and	forensic	
genetics	generally	in	the	criminal	justice	system	(see	also:	Wienroth,	2018)	and	provides	insight	into	
the	 complex	 values	 and	 relationships	 that	 characterise	 the	 intersections	 of	 forensic	 science	 and	
commerce.	
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Concluding	remarks	
Ethical	deliberations	can	employ	the	analysis	of	practice	as	a	lens	through	which	to	enable	normative	
statements	about	a	specific	ethical	concern.	This	‘practice	turn’	has	founds	its	equivalent	in	the	turn	
towards	ethics	that	can	be	observed	in	science	policy.	Today,	many	scientists	recognise	the	value	of,	
or	the	need	to,	engage	with	ethical	aspects	of	their	work,	especially	as	a	way	of	legitimising	the	use	of	
new	and	emerging	 scientific	 knowledge	 and	 technology	 in	 social	 contexts,	 e.g.	 to	 address	 societal	
priorities	such	as	security	and	justice.	One	such	approach	has	been	discussed	in	this	paper.	
The	 case	 study	 provides	 an	 insight	 into	 scientific	 practitioners’	 ethical	 reasoning	 about	 scientific	
claims-making	in	the	public	domain	(i.e.	outside	the	scientific	domain),	about	scientific	practice,	and	
to	a	degree	also	about	 the	operational	use	of	 forensic	 genetics	 technologies.	By	 relating	 scientific	
state-of-art,	 the	 validation	 of	 technologies	 for	 potential	 use,	 and	 public	 expectations	 about	 the	
capacity	 of	 FDP	 to	 contribute	 to	 investigations,	 scientific	 practitioners	 contest	 the	 commercial	
company	Parabon’s	claim	on	how	to	understand	and	apply	these	technologies.	They	articulate	their	
concerns	 about	 the	 impact	 of	 accepting	 Parabon’s	 scientific	 and	 operational	 assertions	 about	
SnapshotTM	 in	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system,	 combining	 such	 concerns	 with	 their	 accounts	 of	 good	
scientific	 practice,	 the	 need	 to	 understand	 the	 parameters	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 FDP	 analysis,	 and	 the	
constitution	 of	 a	 community	 of	 relevant	 and	 legitimate	 champions	 in	 and	 of	 the	 field.	 There	 is	 a	
competitive	 edge	 to	 these	 articulations,	 as	 scientific	 practitioners,	 who	 compete	 for	 funding	 and	
conduct	their	own	research,	aim	to	re-establish	scientific	authority	over	a	commercial	product	as	they	
ascribe	primarily	commercial	over	scientific	commitments	and	emphases	to	SnapshotTM,	a	service	that	
draws	its	perceived	strength	from	a	scientific	basis	in	forensic	genetics.	Scientific	practitioners	assert	
that	commercial	service	provision	should	be	based	on	scientific	validation	first	before	entering	the	
market,	setting	academic	over	commercial	rules.	Contrasting	Parabon’s	SnapshotTM	service	with	their	
work,	 scientists	 develop	 a	public	 scientific	 ethic	 constituted	by	 argumentation	 about	 the	need	 for	
technology	validation	before	application,	accessibility	to	algorithms	and	logics	of	analysis	software,	
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and	participation	as	well	as	collaboration	of	technology	developers	and	users	in	and	with	the	wider	
forensic	genetics	community.	This	disagreement	is	also	an	instance	of	scientists	aiming	to	re-assert	
scientific	primacy	over	legal	or	juridical	concerns	in	the	consideration	of	forensic	genetics	technologies	
that	 may	 produce	 intelligence	 rather	 than	 evidence–while	 navigating	 the	 need	 to	 engage	 with	
commercial	entities	in	the	pursuit	of	forensic	science	research.	The	intersections	attended	to	in	this	
analysis	are	part	of	the	political	economy	of	forensic	science	research	and	use.		
For	the	wider	use	of	this	analysis,	it	stands	to	reason	that	the	practices	of	understanding	and	reflecting	
on	 ‘ethical	moments’	of	disagreement,	and	contextualising	 these,	make	more	visible	 the	 interests,	
values	 and	 agents	 entangled	 in	 emerging	 technologies.	 Ethical	 moments	 can	 provide	 a	 way	 into	
deepening	the	engagement	with	scientific	practitioners	about	ethical	deliberation	of	the	capacities	
and	 limitations	of	a	given	emerging	 technology,	and	 its	good	governance.	 Identifying	and	studying	
‘ethical	 moments’	 in	 scientific	 practice	 as	 a	 collaborative	 effort	 by	 scientists,	 social	 analysts	 and	
ethicists	can	provide	a	familiar	context	for	practitioners	within	which	ethical	reasoning	can	be	worked	
out,	and	to	translate	such	moments	into	deliberative	acts	outside	of	that	ethical	moment,	and	outside	
of	the	protected	space	into	discursive	spaces	of	technology	adoption	in	society.	
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